UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

12-1-2017

State v. Crawford Appellant's Brief Dckt. 45190

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported

Recommended Citation
"State v. Crawford Appellant's Brief Dckt. 45190" (2017). Not Reported. 4357.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/4357

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
NO. 45190
)
v.
)
Ada Co. CR-2010-7100
)
SHANE ERIK CRAWFORD,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
)
________________________
APPELLANT’S BRIEF
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF ADA
________________________
HONORABLE MICHAEL J. REARDON
Presiding District Judge
________________________
GREG S. SILVEY
Silvey Law Office Ltd
P.O. Box 1974
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 286-7400

KENNETH JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-2400

ATTORNEY FOR
APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................ 1
Nature of the Case.................................................................................... 1
Course of Proceedings .............................................................................. 1
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ................................................................... 4
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................... 5
The district court erred by denying the motion to correct
illegal sentence ........................................................................................ 5
A. Standard of review......................................................................... 5
B. The claims and the court’s ruling ................................................. 5
C. The current law concerning motions to correct
illegal sentence ............................................................................ 11
D. The court erred denying the motion to correct
illegal sentence ............................................................................ 12
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 15
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE AND SERVICE ................................. 16

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82 (2009) ............................................................ 11
State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 170 P.3d 397 (2007) ....................................... 5
State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837 (2011) ............................................................. 11-12
State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55 (2015) .................................................................. 11

Other Authority:
I.C. § 18-1508 ...................................................................................................... 5
I.C. § 19-2522 ...................................................................................................... 5
I.C.R. 35 ............................................................................................................. 11

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Appellant Shane Crawford (hereinafter Appellant) appeals from an
order denying his motion to correct illegal sentence. Appellant asserted that
the district court erred by failing to order a psychological evaluation after
being put on notice by the psychosexual report.
Course of Proceedings
The original proceedings were lengthy in this matter, but were
relatively succinctly described in the district court’s order denying motion to
correct illegal sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter Order):
In 2010, defendant SHANE ERIC CRAWFORD, was charged
with four counts of sexual misconduct with his teenage
daughters occurring between 2007 and 2009 – Two felony counts
of Lewd Conduct with a Child Under Sixteen, in violation of I.C.
§ 18-1508 (Counts I and II), and two felony counts of Sexual
Abuse with a Minor Under Sixteen, in violation of I.C. § 18-1506
(Counts III and IV). Defendant pled not guilty and went to jury
trial. At trial, defendant’s daughters testified as witnesses
against him. A jury found defendant guilty of Counts I and II.
He was acquitted on the remaining two counts.
Prior to sentencing, the court ordered a psychosexual evaluation
of defendant, which was conducted by Michael D. Johnston,
Ph.D., and memorialized in a January 2011 report. That report,
as well as a January 28, 2010, Pre-Sentence Investigation
Report (“PSI”) prepared in relation to defendant’s previous
conviction for Injury to a Child (Ada County Case No. CR-FE2009-12074), were among the documents considered by the court
at sentencing. At the sentencing hearing, the state argued that
based upon Dr. Johnston’s assessment, defendant was
unamenable to treatment, and brought to the court several
disciplinary actions that were taken against him while he was
incarcerated on an unrelated matter. The state also highlighted
Dr. Johnson’s [sic] opinion that defendant was at moderate risk
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to re-offend, given that he managed his emotions through
repression and denial, negatively influencing his ability to
engage in appropriate sexual behavior.
The court was impressed with Dr. Johnson’s [sic] opinions, and
expressed concerns over defendant’s lack of treatment
amenability, inability to follow rules despite his military
background, and his assessed risk. Accordingly, the court
imposed a twenty-five (25) year aggregate term, six years
determinate (6) on each Count I and Count II, concurrent.
Defendant appealed his convictions to the Idaho Appellate
Court, arguing that the trial court violated his right to due
process by failing to properly instruct the jury and abused its
discretion by imposing excessive sentences. The Court of
Appeals, in an unpublished decision, agreed the jury was
improperly instructed, and vacated Count I. They affirmed his
conviction on Count II and sent the matter back to the trial
court. On remand, Count I was dismissed. State v. Crawford,
No. 38587, 2012 WL 9492960, at *1 (Idaho Ct. App. June 27,
2012)(unpublished). Nonetheless, the length of defendant’s
sentence did not change, as he was sentenced concurrently on
both Counts I and II.
Subsequent to his appeal, defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting ineffective assistance of trial and
appellate counsel. His specific claims were that his trial counsel
failed to move for a Rule 29 acquittal based upon insufficient
evidence, and failed to request more specific jury instructions.
He also alleged that his appellate counsel failed to assert an
insufficiency of the evidence claim. The trial court summarily
dismissed his petition, and the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed.
Crawford v. State, 160 Idaho 586, 377 P.3d 400, 405 (2016),
reh'g denied (June 2, 2016). Defendant continues to seek relief.
Order, 2-3. (R. p. 144-145.)
The instant appeal concerns a motion to correct illegal sentence. On
February 3, 2017, Mr. Crawford filed a pro se motion to correct illegal
sentence with memorandum and affidavit in support, motion for appointment
of counsel, and motion to take judicial notice. (R. p. 48-66.) Counsel was
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appointed. (R. p. 68.) The state filed an objection. (R. p. 71-73.) Despite
being represented, Mr. Crawford filed a pro se response and memorandum in
support (with exhibits) because he had not heard from nor met with his
appointed counsel yet. (R. p. 74-126.)
Mr. Crawford then filed a motion for leave to file an amended response
to correct some errors and submitted a memorandum in support. (R. p. 127141.)
The district court issued its order regarding motion to correct illegal
sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35. (R. p. 143-154.)
Mr. Crawford timely appeals. (R. p. 155-159.)
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ISSUE
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE MOTION TO
CORRECT ILLEGAL SENTENCE
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ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE MOTION TO
CORRECT ILLEGAL SENTENCE
A.

Standard of review
Whether a sentence is illegal is a question of law, over which an

appellate court exercises free review. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 735,
170 P.3d 397, 400 (2007).
B.

The claims and the court’s ruling
In its Order, the district court liberally construed Mr. Crawford’s

motions so as to encompass all asserted grounds of relief. (R. p. 146.) The
district court characterized Mr. Crawford’s claims as 1) his sentence was
illegal because there was insufficient evidence to meet the elements of I.C. §
18-1508, 2) he was incompetent during the proceedings or suffered from a
mental disease or defect that may have constituted a defense, and 3) the trial
court failed to order an evaluation under I.C. § 19-2522 to assist in fashioning
an appropriate sentence. (Id.)
First, as to the insufficient evidence claim, the court ruled as follows:
Defendant first alleges that there was insufficient evidence
presented at trial to support a jury finding that he engaged in
lewd and lascivious acts upon his daughter. CRAWFORD
contends that during his daughter’s testimony, she relayed that
defendant had contact with her body, near her genital area, but
did not volunteer that contact actually occurred with her
genitals. Instead, she affirmed this type of contact only when
she was led and prompted by the prosecution. Defendant did not
specify in his motion how this constituted insufficient evidence.
The court can only surmise that the basis for defendant’s claim
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is that evidence should not have been admitted and considered
by the jury, or that the prosecution somehow improperly led a
witness. An argument based on these grounds either relates to
defendant’s counsel’s purported ineffective assistance of counsel
in failing to object or the trial court’s erroneous admission of
evidence. This is akin to an examination of potential trial errors,
and a challenge to the validity of the conviction, which are
beyond the scope of a Rule 35(a) motion. Such purported errors
must be brought through a direct appeal or post-conviction
relief. Pers., v. State, 147 Idaho 453, 455, 210 P.3d 561, 563 (Ct.
App. 2009)(“The appellate courts of this state have held that an
issue not properly preserved in a criminal proceeding may be
considered on direct appeal or by a court in a post-conviction
relief action if the issue involves fundamental error.”). Moreover,
as the prosecution points out, defendant had an opportunity to
raise this or similar issues in his previous appeals and petition
for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, defendant’s insufficiency
of the evidence argument is rejected. . . .
Order, p. 6. (R. p. 148.)
Second, the court took up the competency and/or mental illness claim:
Defendant asserts that his sentence is illegal because he was
either incompetent when the crime was committed or during the
proceedings; alternatively, even if his mental state did not rise
to the level of incompetence, it may have constituted a defense
to the crimes. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits prosecution of a defendant who is not
competent to stand trial. A defendant is not competent, and the
criminal proceedings against him must be stayed, if his “mental
condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the
nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with
counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense.” Drope v.
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975).
This is codified in I.C. § 18-210, which states, no person who as a
result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand
the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense shall
be tried, convicted, sentenced or punished for the commission of
an offense so long as such incapacity endures.” If the [sic] “the
competency question has not been raised, the trial judge has no
duty to independently inquire as to the competency of the
defendant.” State v. Fuchs, 100 Idaho 341, 346, 597 P.2d 227,
232 (1979). Conversely, when there is reason to doubt a
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defendant’s competency, the court shall order and appoint a
qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine
defendant and report on his capacity. I.C. § 18-211. After such
evaluation, if the court finds defendant competent to stand trial,
proceedings shall be reinstated; if the court finds defendant
incompetent, he shall, with few exceptions, be committed to the
custody of the Idaho Department of Health & Welfare for the
purpose of restoring his competency. I.C. § 18-212.
Distinct from competence to stand trial, a defendant’s particular
mental state can operate as a defense in a specific intent crime.
A requisite element of both types of crimes against defendant,
Lewd Conduct and Sexual Assault with a child is that
“defendant committed the crime with the specific intent to
arouse, appeal to, or gratify the lust or passions or sexual
desires of the defendant, of such child, or of some other person.”
IDJI 922; IDJI 929. Defendant is correct to assert that had he
been suffering from a mental illness, his attorney may have
presented evidence of such to mitigate the required state of
mind. IDJI 1506.
However, defendant’s competency and mental illness defense
arguments, like the insufficiency of the evidence argument, are
actually an attack on the legality of his conviction, requiring a
reviewing court to examine the pre-sentence proceedings for
irregularity. They are beyond the purview of a Rule 35 (a)
motion. Like the defendant in Housley v. State, 119 Idaho 885,
889, 811 P.2d 495, 499 (Ct. App. 1991), CRAWFORD’s “premise
for this particular motion [appears to be] . . . that if his
conviction is illegal his sentence must be illegal. Therefore, to
‘correct’ his illegal sentence he must be permitted to attack his
conviction along with his sentence. These allegations, attacking
the validity of Housley's conviction, are beyond the scope of a
Rule 35 motion. Other remedies, such as appeal or a petition for
post-conviction relief, are available to set aside a wrongful
conviction. The Rule 35 motion serves a narrower purpose. It
subjects only the sentence to re-examination.” Id. Moreover,
even if this court were able to look behind the record of the
conviction to assess his mental state relating to competency or a
defense, defendant’s arguments are conclusory. He points to no
evidence suggesting any party had concerns based upon his
mental health, nor does he contend that he actually suffered
mentally such that it affected his ability to participate in his
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defense, or that it affected his actions during perpetration of the
crime. Accordingly, these claims are rejected. . . .
Order, p. 6-8. (R. p. 148-150.)
Third, the court considered Mr. Crawford’s claim that a mental health
examination was necessary for sentencing:
Defendant argues the district court erred by not ordering a full
mental health evaluation in preparation for his sentencing as
required under I.C. § 19-2522, particularly since the need for
such report was clear from the contents of the psychosexual
evaluation. I.C. §19-2522 states in part:
(1) If there is reason to believe the mental condition of the
defendant will be a significant factor at sentencing and for
good cause shown, the court shall appoint at least one (1)
psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine and
report upon the mental condition of the defendant. . . .
(3) The report of the examination shall include the
following: (a) A description of the nature of the
examination; (b) A diagnosis, evaluation or prognosis of
the mental condition of the defendant; (c) An analysis of
the degree of the defendant's illness or defect and level of
functional impairment; (d) A consideration of whether
treatment is available for the defendant's mental
condition; (e) An analysis of the relative risks and benefits
of treatment or nontreatment; (f) A consideration of the
risk of danger which the defendant may create for the
public if at large. . .
(6) If a mental health examination of the defendant has
previously been conducted, whether pursuant to section 192524, Idaho Code, or for any other purpose, and a report of
such examination has been submitted to the court, and if
the court determines that such examination and report
provide the necessary information required in subsection
(3) of this section, and the examination is sufficiently
recent to reflect the defendant's present mental condition,
then the court may consider such prior examination and
report as the examination and report required by this
section and need not order an additional examination of
the defendant's mental condition. The provisions of this
subsection shall not apply to examinations and reports
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performed or prepared pursuant to section 18-211 or 18212, Idaho Code, for the purpose of determining the
defendant's fitness to proceed, unless the defendant
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently consents to
having such examination and report used at sentencing.
Id. (emphasis added). CRAWFORD contends that p. 14 of Dr.
Johnston’s report includes findings which suggest a mental
defect or illness to which the court should have responded.
Further, defendant contends the psychosexual evaluation falsely
indicated that a psychiatrist was involved in the process, which
may have improperly swayed the court. In sum, that the court’s
failure to follow the statutes by ordering and considering a full
mental report caused it to impose an unlawful sentence.
Defendant’s assertions are unfounded.
The psychosexual evaluation included as a component of
defendant’s presentence investigation indicates that Dr.
Johnston conducted a clinical interview including a mental
status examination, consulted various resources, and
administered several tests, among them the MMPI, Multiphasic
Sex Inventory-II, Personality Assessment Inventory, STATIC
99, substance abuse screening, and State-Trait Anger
Expression Inventory-2 (STAXI-II). He diagnosed defendant as
having a history of child sexual abuse (denied by defendant) and
antisocial personality traits. (Mountain States Psychosexual
Evaluation Report, 1/14/2011). Defendant takes issue with the
fact that Dr. Johnston noted in his report that defendant was
defensive, that his response pattern suggested suppressed
sexual deviancy scores, that he was intolerant and judgmental
to societal expected sexual behaviors, defendant appeared to
present himself more favorably than actual. (Mountain States
Psychosexual Evaluation Report, 1/14/2011, p. 14).
First, defendant has read the report out of context. The findings
listed above are a summary of the results of the authors of the
interpreted MMPI test. In addition, where Dr. Johnston writes
that defendant show signs similar to those who uses repression
and denial when dealing with anger, he is referencing the
STAXI-II test results. This report and the findings therein
sufficed to provide the court with necessary information to make
a determination as to whether defendant was a viable candidate
for probation and safe for the community. The fact that this
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report was not restricted to a mental health evaluation is of no
import. Moreover, those findings do not reveal a mental illness;
even if they did, there is no evidence that such condition rose to
the level of incompetency. Chico-Rodriguez v. State, 141 Idaho
579, 581, 114 P.3d 137, 139 (Ct. App. 2005)(defendant’s
competency challenged [sic] rejected because although he
suffered from a mental disorder, it was not so severe as [to]
render him incompetent at sentencing or to prevent him from
filing a post-conviction action). A person tending to be defensive
or repress his feelings is not necessarily mentally ill. Nor does
defendant assert he suffered from actual mental illness, or
explain how that affected his case. He simply raises the
argument that another evaluation should have been ordered.
Defendant also relies upon cases that are factually and
procedurally dissimilar. For instance, in State v. McFarland, the
defendant committed a violent murder. He contended he could
not remember the event. His requests for a psychological
evaluation both [at] pretrial and before sentencing were denied.
He filed a direct appeal. Upon review, the court noted that
McFarland’s “sudden escalation from relatively petty crimes to
the brutal act committed against Mr. Bart, coupled with the
uncontroverted evidence that McFarland suffers from some
unspecified mental disability rendering his level of mental
functioning as “borderline,” his mood swings and his claimed
inability to remember any events from the night of the murder,
are circumstances which beg for a psychological evaluation no
less forcefully than did those outlined in French.” 125 Idaho 876,
880, 876 P.2d 158, 162 (Ct. App. 1994).
Defendant also cites to State v. Sabin, where the trial court
erred by not ordering a psychological report prior to sentencing,
since Sabin had a solid work history and no prior criminal
record yet sexually abused his stepdaughters and other young
girls. 120 Idaho 780, 783–84, 820 P.2d 375, 378–79 (Ct. App.
1991). In State v. French, 95 Idaho 853, 522 P.2d 61 (1974),
defendant’s sentence for rape was vacated and remanded for
resentencing because “the omission of [a psychological]
evaluation in this case deprived the district court of pertinent
information essential to pronouncing an appropriate judgment.”
Id. at 855, 522 P.2d at 63 (French was also decided prior to
enactment of I.C. §19-2522).
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In McFarland, French and Sabin, the defendants had filed a
direct appeal, and presumably, the reviewing court conducted
factual inquiries beyond the face of the record. No psychological
reports had been ordered there, even when counsel requested
the same. Here, no party raised a concern regarding mental
health, no party requested an additional or separate report, and
a report was actually prepared which was compliant with I.C. §
19-2522 and provided the necessary detail to the court.
Furthermore, the contents of that report did not reveal mental
illness or defect or incompetency. As such, CRAWFORD’s last
argument is rejected.
Order, p. 8-11. (R. p. 150-153.)
.
C.

The current law concerning motions to correct illegal sentence
The current version of Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) provides as follows:
a) Illegal Sentences. The court may correct a sentence that is
illegal from the face of the record at any time.

I.C.R. Rule 35.
In the instant case, the district court discussed State v. Clements, 148
Idaho 82 (2009), in regards to the proper scope of Rule 35. However, even
more recently the Supreme Court in State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55 (2015),
reaffirmed Clements (following State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837 (2011)):
This Court has made clear that Rule 35 motions to correct an
illegal sentence must be read narrowly and that under Rule 35,
a trial court cannot examine the underlying facts of a crime to
which a defendant pled guilty to determine if the sentence is
illegal. See State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84—87, 218 P.3d
1143, 1145—148 (2009). Moreover, Rule 35's purpose is to allow
courts to correct illegal sentences, not to reexamine errors
occurring at trial or before the imposition of the sentence. Id. at
85, 218 P.3d at 1146 (citing Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424,
430, 82 S. Ct. 468, 7 L. Ed. 2d 417 (1962)). Therefore, we have
defined an "illegal sentence" as one that is illegal from the face
of the record, does not involve significant questions of fact, and
does not require an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 86, 218 P.3d at
11

1147. Because an illegal sentence may be corrected at any time,
Rule 35 must necessarily be limited to uphold the finality of
judgments. Id. We have stated that:
Rule 35 is not a vehicle designed to re-examine the facts
underlying the case to determine whether a sentence is
illegal; rather, the rule only applies to a narrow category
of cases in which the sentence imposes a penalty that is
simply not authorized by law or where new evidence tends
to show that the original sentence was excessive.
Id. Therefore, we want to clarify that Rule 35 inquiries must
involve only questions of law—they may not include significant
factual determinations to resolve the merits of a Rule 35 claim.
If a district court does inquire and make significant factual
determinations, it exceeds its scope of authority under Rule 35.
Id. at 87—88, 218 P.3d at 1148—49.
Id. p. 65 (emphasis in the original).
D.

The court erred denying the motion to correct illegal sentence
While being mindful of the controlling caselaw, Appellant nevertheless

argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to correct illegal
sentence.
First, regarding the fact there was never any indication he needed a
psychological evaluation, Appellant pointed out below that it was not his
mistake. He was represented by counsel and prosecuted by an attorney and it
was their responsibility pursuant to the rules of professional conduct. (R. p.
134.)
More to the point, Appellant’s primary specific claim is that the district
court erred by failing to order a psychological evaluation after it was put on
notice in the psychosexual report. (R. p. 136.) Appellant argued as follows in
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his Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Amend a Response to
State’s Objection:
Defendant is not claiming in any way that his sentence was
illegally imposed. Defendant is claiming that pursuant to I.C. §
19-2522 that, the court, failed to order a psychological
evaluation after it was put on notice in the psycho sexual report.
The report specifically stated:
The authors of the MSI-II indicated the examinee
responded to a high percentage of items in the “false”
direction, in addition to validity scores suggesting he was
defensive and attempted to present himself favorably.
Consequently, the authors stated there was limited
information for interpretive purposes, and the examinee’s
response pattern suggested he had suppressed some
sexual deviance scale scores. With this in mind, the
authors reported the examinee has had a history of sexual
deviancy, does not recognize the behaviors that preceded
his inappropriate sexual behavior, and attempted to
present himself as asexual. Also, his profile indicated he
has thinking errors, attributes, behaviors, and sexual
attitudes very similar to those of known sexual offenders.
Additionally, there was evidence he has difficulty dealing
with normal sexual interests that suggested he may be
highly intolerant and judgmental regarding societal
expected sexual behaviors, and the display of the female
form in a way which most adults view as normal.
Lastly, the authors indicated the examinee should be
considered for diagnosis of sexual abuse of a child, and
that there was likely more to know about him than, he
was willing to disclose at this time.
Dr. Johnstons report pp. 14.
Defendant asserts that had [prosecutor] been acting within the
rules of professional conduct, Rule 4.1 be truthful in her
statements and Rule 3.1 she would have read I.C. 18-210 192522 and 19-2523 and advised the court that defendant need[ed]
a psychological evaluation. However, this [is] not about
[prosecutor’s] inadequacy as an attorney or prosecutor. This
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motion was filed to notify the court that Judge Copsey was
presented with evidence, that shows, that the Defendant
suffered from a mental illness. This was also manifested as
stated by Judge Copsey. State v. Crawford, 377 P.3d 400, 2016
Ida Lexus 108, 2016 WL 1358105 (Idaho 2016) The court was
required to order an evaluation before sentencing and failed to
do so. State v. McFarland, 125 Idaho 876, 876 P.2d 158 (Ct.App.
1994)
Defendant sighted [sic] State v. Sabin, 120 Idaho 780, 820 P.2d
375 (1991) . . . .
.
.
.
Defendant argues that when Dr. Johnston’s report was finished
and submitted those statements made by the Doctor were more
significant than those within Sabin. The court in Sabin, affirm
the conviction but, however, vacated the sentences imposed and
remanded the case directing the court to obtain a psychological
evaluation and any additional information which the court
deems appropriate for the purposes of resentencing.
Defendant also advise, the court, that even though the heading
in Idaho Code section 18-210 states in part lack of capacity to
understand proceedings—delay of trial, the specific language
which is relevant here is that the defendant shall not be “tried,
convicted, sentenced or punished” at any time, while such
incapacitation exists. The psychosexual clearly calls for a more
thorough evaluation as well as the generation of a specified
report as in Idaho Code section 19-2522(3). The court could not
generate this report, so there is not any admissible evidence,
either mitigating or aggravating before the court in order to
sentence the Defendant.
Therefore, because there was a question of the Defendant’s
competency, as stated in the psychosexual Defendant argues
that district court abused its discretion by failing to order sua
sponte a psychological evaluation pursuant to I.C. 19-2522
which the court is required to do within the specified language of
2522. The court failed to do so and pronounced a sentence in
violation of I.C. § 19-2512, making the sentence illegal.
Id., p. 6-10 (some capitalization and grammar corrected) R. p. 136-140.
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Accordingly, for these reasons, Appellant requests this Court reverse
the order of the district court denying his motion to correct illegal sentence
and vacate the sentence and conviction.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Crawford requests this Court reverse the order of the district court
denying his motion to correct illegal sentence and vacate his sentence and
conviction.
DATED this 1st day of December, 2017.
/s/ Greg S. Silvey
Greg S. Silvey
Attorney for Appellant
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